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Zero Tolerance Case Law DUSTIN W. SEAL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALLEN MORGAN, Superintendent, Knox County School (99-5090/5600); KNOX COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION (99-5600), Defendants-Appellants, VICKI DUNAWAY, Principal, Powell High School, et al., Defendants. Nos. 99-5090/99-5600 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 24939; 2000 FED App. 0358P (6th Cir.) January 26, 2000, Argued October 6, 2000, Decided October 6, 2000, Filed For now here is the conclusion of the case, as written. IV. CONCLUSION We would not for a minute minimize the Board's obligation to maintain the safety of its campuses, and its right to mete out appropriate discipline (including expulsion) to students who commit serious violations of its rules. But we cannot accept the Board's argument that because safety is important, and because it is often difficult to determine a student's state of mind, that it need not make any attempt to ascertain whether a student accused of carrying a weapon knew that he was in possession of the weapon before expelling him. The decision to expel a student from school is a weighty one, carrying with it serious consequences for the student. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 576 ("Education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments, and the total exclusion from the educational process for more than a trivial period . . . is a serious event in the life of the suspended child.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We understand full well that the decision not to expel a potentially dangerous student also carries very serious potential consequences for other [*40] students and teachers. Nevertheless, the Board may not absolve itself of its obligation, legal and moral, to determine whether students intentionally committed the acts for which their expulsions are sought by hiding behind a Zero Tolerance Policy that purports to make the students' knowledge a non-issue. We are also not impressed by the Board's argument that if it did not apply its Zero Tolerance Policy ruthlessly, and without regard for whether students accused of possessing a forbidden object knowingly possessed the object, this would send an inconsistent message to its students. Consistency is not a substitute for rationality. For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
court to the extent that it denied the Board's motion for summary judgment,
REVERSE the judgment of the district court to the extent that it entered
summary judgment in Seal's favor on the issue of liability, and REMAND
this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. With
regard to Superintendent Morgan's appeal, we REVERSE the judgment of
the district court and remand with instructions to enter summary judgment
in his favor. They did those of us fighting ZT in the courts a great service with
the publication of this Article. They applied the same standard that typically applies regarding the
reversal of a decision or judgment made by an administrative bocy like
a school board. That is, it should only be reversed if the decision is
unsubstantiated by the facts, patently unreasonable, contrary to the
rule of law, arbitrary and capricious etc. In this case both the commissioner
and the State Board of Education felt the Piscataway School Board was
unreasonable in its decision for failing to adequately weigh or consider
the childs young age and the fact that it ws her first offense of any
kind. You can see the case in its entirety at: You will need acrobat reader to view it. Acrobat Reader is available
free for download from a number of sites including the New
Jersey State BOE site. There, the court found that the board had not adopted a zero-tolerance
policy. In Fuller, students argued that they were expelled by the School
Board for a period of two years because of a "zero tolerance" policy
which punished them as a group, denied their constitutional rights and
was racially motivated. The students additionally argued that they were The Fuller court found that the students failed to establish that a "zero
tolerance policy" existed. While the School Board adopted a resolution
which declared a "no- tolerance position on school violence," this
policy was found to have had no impact on the students. The "no-tolerance" position
was considered to be more of a political statement against crime. For instance, in Board of School Trustees v. Barnell, 678 N.E.2d 799
(Ind. App. 1997), an Indiana Appellate Court reviewed the expulsion of
a student that brought a knife to school. The student conduct guidelines
provided that students faced automatic expulsion for bringing a knife
to In Clinton Municipal Separate School District v. Byrd, 477 So.2d 237 (Miss. 1985), two high school students that defaced school property were suspended for a semester. The school board had adopted a policy which provided that if a student defaced school property, he or she shall be suspended or expelled. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that a mandatory school disciplinary rule is not unconstitutional simply because it is mandatory. The Court pointed out that a school rule that is couched in mandatory terms does not necessarily withdraw discretion from a School Board. "That a school rule may be worded in mandatory language does not deprive school boards and their subordinates of the authority to administer the rule with flexibility and leniency. The school board may choose not to exercise its power of leniency. In doing so, however, it may not hide behind the notion that the law prohibits leniency for there is no such law." In Mitchell v. Board of Trustees of Oxford Municipal Separate School
District, 625 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1980) the court recognized that a mandatory
disciplinary rule adopted by a school board can be unconstitutional if
there is no rational relationship between the punishment and the offense;
however, the rule is not unconstitutional simply because it is mandatory. People In re K.P., 182 Colo. 409 Our school district has taken it upon themselves to extend zero tolerance (mandatory expulsion) to offenses that are not specifically specified by statuted as cases that required mandatory expulsion. Many school districts have done the same thing (although its more typically mandatory suspension but not necessarily expulsion). At any rate, in Colorado they typically use, as their statutory authority for this freelancing, CRS 22-33-106, (1) (c) which states that grounds for suspension or expulsion is: "Behavior on or off school property which is detrimental to the welfare or safety of other pupils or of school personnel including behavior which creates a threat of physical harm to the child or to other children" The supreme court in the above decision added an important qualifier
this language. Specifically they stated that, "The conduct proscribed
is strictly limited to conduct which is hostile to welfare, safety, or
morals and could not be utilized to prohibit all forms of socially unacceptable
conduct." This interpretation has been cited in several subsequent
court decisions and is still considered valid to the best of my knowledge
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